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Object oriented programming concepts have been widely adopted by the modern 
design of enterprise applications, which relies on heap memory mapping, and re-use of 
pre-coded class libraries. Computing resource sharing such as containerization, is a 
popular way to effectively reduce operation overhead by enlarging the scale of kernel 
accessibility among distributed computer systems. Thus, proper isolation between 
processes, containers and host operating systems is a critical task to assure system 
wide information security. This is a study designed to compare kernel level memory 
management and protection effectiveness for Docker container systems maintained on 
top of Ubuntu Linux and Microsoft Windows as the host operating system. Literature 
research aims to study the fundamentals of kernel memory management designs, 
policies and modules in place for enforcement. As well as container architectures based 
on the variation of the host operating systems. The experimental design focuses on 
whether the discovery of unauthorized access is possible between containers, kernel 
spaces and file systems. Research results are targeted to determine a better approach 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
Traditionally, enterprise applications ran on their own operating system and at 
times, standalone physical servers. While the separation of software on specific 
hardware fulfills not only reliability, but also basic data security requirements, this 
method also generates a huge computing resource waste, especially when utilizing 
today’s hardware capabilities (“IBM Cloud Education”, 2019). Varieties of virtualization 
technologies have been researched and developed since the 1960s (Douglis & Krieger, 
2013), to enable the possibility of multi-tenancy for applications running on singular 
hardware. Computing capital sharing among distributed systems is becoming more 
popular for many reasons such as, immense resource overhead, reducing high utility 
costs, and cloud adoption strategies just to name a few. Virtual zones, virtual machines, 
and containers are some of the ways that allow systems to utilize hardware resources 
more efficiently together.  
With the greater effectiveness of computer hardware capacity distribution, such 
as with memory in a shared virtualized environment, security problems and threats that 
comes with it are sometimes overlooked (Zahedi, 2014). Typical virtual machines may 
use software-based memory virtualization to share memory resources from a physical 
host machine (“vSphere Documentation”, n.d.). The Docker engine applies LXC-like 
namespaces to share and separate memory allocations for each container run on the 
host, and because of this design, its memory content protection relies heavily on the 





the current research in this discipline, create appropriate test-beds to compare the 
differences on how kernel memory management and protection is provided to Docker 
containers among various host operating systems, and conclude with results to show 
better security approaches when deciding on which host operating system to use for 
new Docker container system design and implementation.  
Problem Statement  
The greater computing resource sharing is employed, the more it can lead to a 
variety of security concerns and problems. In containerized systems, kernel resources 
like system memory, are often shared in between one another. A particular problem 
rises on how to properly separate the host operating system level shared kernel 
memory space. And to provide information assurance, in case of any individual 
container or host machine itself is compromised, while efficiently providing sufficient 
memory allocation spaces for the container engine daemon. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem   
Kernel memory has been an attack surface for many reasons. Advanced memory 
level attacks can cause significant service damage to applications or entire computing 
environments. Different base operating systems adopt diversified kernel level memory 
management techniques, therefor the attack prevention provided will also vary. Poorly 
designed or implemented memory protection mechanisms can directly lead to 





Objective of the Research  
This thesis will explore fundamental kernel memory management functions and 
policies, discover methodologies which different container host operating systems 
utilize, compare the security solutions provided to possible memory vulnerabilities and 
conclude with an answer for the potential secure combination while deploying with 
Docker containers using current technology. 
Research Questions  
1. How does kernel memory management work on Microsoft Windows or 
Ubuntu Linux? 
2. Can a misused Docker container become a tool for unauthorized permission 
escalation? How do reactions differ between operating systems? 
3. Are memory mappings of running Docker containers readable or writeable by 
sidecar containers? How do reactions differ between operating systems? 
4. Can kernel memory management tools be misused by non-root users within a 
Docker container for hacking? How are kernel reactions different?  
Definition of Terms 
Kernel: Kernel is the core of a computer operating system software, which 
oversees every connection between software and hardware. It is one of the first portions 






Virtualization: According to VMware.com, it is: “the process of creating a 
software-based, or virtual, representation of something, such as virtual applications, 
servers, storage and networks.” (“Virtualization”, n.d.) 
Docker Container: A lightweight execution environment developed by Docker, 
Inc. which provides shared host operating system kernel resources but isolates running 
processes. 
Object-oriented programming: Program procedure formed by code, written based 
on the “object” concept, which is constructed by its properties (“Object-oriented 
programming”, n.d.) 
Heap: Index of memory locations of objects for a program written with object-
oriented language. 
Summary 
 With the brief background information introduced, it is not difficult to see that a 
well-built memory management mechanism is fundamental for securing Docker 
containers, and the host operating system is one that provides the functionalities. 
Chapter II will provide an in-depth review of current research literature on this topic, 
seeking possible tool sets to build a test bed, answers or solutions to research 






Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction  
 Current research literature is explored to better understand operating system 
fundamentals that make Docker container technology possible, its history and future, 
and what they provide for computing security prerequisites. As well as, how this 
research is designed methodology wise. 
 A considerable amount of literature review for this research is conducted with 
operating system documentation, such as referencing “The Linux Kernel v5.6.0-rc6” by 
“The kernel development community” at www.kernel.org and “Windows Kernel-Mode 
Driver Architecture” from Microsoft Dev Center at docs.microsoft.com. These kernel 
module documentations are primary sources to understand kernel functionalities and 
policies regarding their operating system principles.  
Background and Current Research  
Physical and Virtual Memory. Physical memory, that is, memory hardware 
actually installed in a computer, is an essential yet limited resource in traditional 
computing hardware design. Even though some of today’s technology agrees to hot-
pluggable memory, there is always a hard boundary of the maximum size of memory 
one computer can expand to. (“The Linux Kernel”, n.d.) Random-access memory is a 
popular form factor of physical memory, it enables reading and writing data by using the 
same amount of time regardless of where data is physically located on a hardware chip, 





memory / storage devices (Azimane, 2006). Therefore, physical memory is usually 
accessed by dedicated yet random assigned address ranges (page frames), frame size 
also depends on the implementation of hardware architectures. With how physical 
memory access works as explained, not much effort is necessary to see that direct 
interaction with physical memory is not an easy task for operating systems and 
application developers, and to avoid this complication virtual memory was developed. 
Physical memory is usually divided into pages, which are often to be sized to 4 Kbytes, 
but is dependent on architecture specifications. With virtual memory in place, every 
single memory access handle is given a virtual address. Multiple virtual memory pages 
are possible to be mapped to each single physical page frame and are structured with a 
hierarchical design. Memory management unit (MMU) is the hardware that passes all 
memory references through and translates a virtual memory address to physical 
memory address (Pichai & Hsu & Bhattacharjee, 2015). In modern hardware platforms, 
MMU is often integrated within the computer’s central processing unit (CPU) on its 
critical processing path. The translation look-aside buffer (TLB) built in MMU caches 
freshly obtained page table entries (PTE), this reduces address lookup frequency. This 
way, memory paging is able to deliver a high-performance memory allocation and 
address translation (Gandhi & Karakostas & Ayar & Cristal & Hill & McKinley & 
Nemirovsky & Swift & Unsal, 2016). Virtual memory holds abstract data residing in 
physical memory, which allows only essential portions of application runtime data and 





Access, Control and Protection to Virtual Memory of Linux Kernel. Memory 
paging control and protection mechanisms are also implemented within virtual memory 
by operating system kernels, and are usually performed during kernel build time, by 
defining relevant kernel configurations. In the hierarchical design of virtual memory 
paging, higher level ones often contain physical addresses of pages belong to their 
immediate lower ones, the lowest table thus contains the physical address of actual 
pages utilized by a given application. A pointer of the top-level address table is entered 
into a register, when virtual addresses are translated by MMU, such register is then 
used to access the top-level address table. Since the physical addresses of lower level 
pages are indexed starting with the top-level downwards, the kernel is then able to 
access data pages in each layer. As physical memory is volatile memory, a typical way 
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to ship data in and out of them relies on read or write of files on storage hardware, such 
as a hard drive, solid state drive and possible RAID arrays, which is rather slow in I/O 
speed compared to memory chips. To minimize this process, page caching is 
developed to gain adequate data transfer workflow. The size of cache at various level is 
inversely proportional to its speed. Memory pages are cached both ways regardless of 
reading or writing and are re-useable if the kernel detects and decides to. A 
synchronization function is built into the kernel module, which ensures updated data in 
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Figure 2. Page cache 
Direct memory access (DMA) is a frequently used method to allow different controllers 





allows peripherals to communicate between various buses, but also avoid interaction 
with MMU, which in cases where MMU is integrated with the CPU, it saves CPU cycles 
(Markatos & Katevenis, 1997). Therefore, in practice, DMA helps lower CPU load and 
boosts overall system performance.  
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Figure 3. Direct Memory Access 
Although memory page reuse among application processes or implementation of DMA 
provides performance gains, restrictions on the memory page address of a particular 
process or device can access, has been put in place for multiple security purposes. 
Thus, devices are not allowed to access all addressable memory pages on the same 
system. System kernel categorizes memory pages to targets zones, and aims to 
prevent accidental or unauthorized cross process, device memory access, as well as 
making sure the kernel itself has enough memory allocation available to perform 
essential tasks. Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) is developed and has 






latencies caused by the distance between each processor or processor core and 
physical memory. Processor cores and banks of memory pages are paired into nodes, 
that then practices memory management policies and tasks independently. Table 1 
below, shows a brief list of memory policies that are relevant to this research. 
Table 1  
Kernel Memory Policies relevant to this research 





A government of all memory pages ensures 






Similar usage as system default policy and 





Governs Virtual Memory Area of a specific 
task and ensures page allocation is 
explicit for such task. 
Shared Shared 
objects 
Ensures memory objects shared between 
tasks are only available to specified 
ones, regulates above policies among 
shared memory area. 
 
 
Many applications are written in a way that allocates all memory space it would possibly 
need upfront. It provides a good measure for application reliability from minimizing risk 
of running out of memory, but also creates a waste of memory resources because it 
only consumes all allocated memory in rare cases. The system kernel usually over-
commits virtual memory compared to what it physically has, knowing this application 
behavior can offer more efficient use of memory. However, if some applications are 





memory. (Chase, 2013) Kernel tool “Out-Of-Memory” (OOM) killer offers a way to 
ensure minimum memory is always available for operating system functionality by 
terminating other applications. Processes can be run with a dynamically assigned and 
adjustable oom_score, which is a ranking in case something needs to be stopped to 
release memory. The adjustability of this ranking could also give hackers a possible way 
to initiate a “Denial of Service” attack by shutting down production applications.   
Memory Management – Microsoft Windows. The kernel memory management 
design of Microsoft Windows operating systems also utilizes virtual memory address 
spacing. According to kernel documents found at “Microsoft Dev Center”, in a traditional 
32-bit architecture, each process within such a system is entitled to a maximum of 4 
gigabytes of memory space, multi-threading capable code is allowed to share its 
memory data within all of associated processor threads, although access to virtual 
memory addresses of unrelated processes is prohibited to prevent memory corruption. 
Virtual memory address space is partitioned into higher and lower portions, default 
policy divides the useable memory space evenly, however, and there are available 
tuning options that a system administrator can enable for performance optimization. 
Table 2 illustrates memory space partitioning and tuning with a 4GB memory sample. 
Examples demonstrate a 32-bit system architecture, with limited memory allowance for 
process, however, a more modern 64-bit system is able to handle up to 8 terabytes of 
memory space below Windows version 8 and 128 terabytes currently starting from 






Starting from earlier versions of Windows, such as Windows XP, Microsoft has 
developed Data Execution Prevention (DEP) as a potential road blocker for memory 
buffer overflow attacks. DEP supports the system to assign pages of memory as non-
executable, stopping any malicious code that resides there from being initiated 
(Stojanovski & Gusev & Gligoroski & Knapskog, 2007). When an application makes 
attempts to start code from any of the protected pages, such application will receive 
“STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION” returned and technically bring the application to halt. 
These pages include but are not limited to heap range, stack range or other designated 
memory pools. DEP is started during the operating system boot process and applies 
settings according to policy, system function “GetSystemDEPPolicy” and 
“SetProcessDEPPolicy” can be called from an application to check for current applied 
policies and make changes. By default, memory allocations for heap that is assigned via 
“malloc” or “HeapAlloc” functions are non-executable, therefore running code from the 
process heap is prevented.   
Table 2 
Windows memory space partitioning and tuning with a 4GB memory sample 
Location Address Range Size Usage Tuning 
Low 0x00000000 - 0x7FFFFFFF 2GB Proc None 
(Default) High 0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF 2GB OS 
Low 0x00000000 - 0xBFFFFFFF 3GB Proc 4-gigabyte 
tuning High 0xC0000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF 1GB OS 
Low 0x00000000 - Megabytes 2-3GB Proc Dynamic 






 When programming applications intended to run in Windows environments, the 
Dynamic Link Library (DLL) must be well known. Like most other libraries in 
programming languages, DLLs offer numerous common functionalities (Kari, 1993), 
thus it promotes code reuse, modularization and memory usage optimization. According 
to default Windows memory management policy, virtual memory address space 
allocated for a DLL is only accessible to the process which called such DLL. At times 
where multiple application processes are calling the same DLL, the virtual memory 
pages will be mapped to same physical memory pages, for sharing among all  
processes to start with. 
Once any of those processes are started to commit new data to the shared page, such 
page will then be re-allocated to a dedicated physical memory space. A kernel level 
protection “Copy-on-Write”, updates those processes associated with a virtual memory 
address accordingly to make compliance of a no cross-process memory access policy. 
Process A  Physical 
Memory 
 Process B 
Before:     
Page 1  Page A  Page 1 
Page 2  Page B  Page 2 
Page 3  Page C  Page 3 
Page 4  Page D  Page 4 
     
After:     
Page 1  Page A  Page 1 
Page 2  Page B  Page 2 
Page 3  Page C  Page 3 
Page 4  Page D  Page 4 
  Page E   
 





This lazy evaluation technology makes more efficient physical memory use and saves 
MMU (CPU cycle) by reducing address translation until necessary. (“Microsoft Docs”, 
2017) 
Process, Heap and Hierarchical Design. When researching today’s software 
frameworks and memory related topics, Object-Oriented Programing (OOP) and the 
heap memory architecture is a hard-to- avoid area. Heap corruptions can cause 
software issues that easily become difficult to diagnose (Pravat & Hewardt, 2007). In 
common operating systems, each running piece of program, is assigned with a process 
ID (PID), which represents as the logical address of such code in memory (Bouffard & 
Lackner & Lanet & Johannes, 2015). The kernel as the core of the operating system 
manages these memory segments. Today, enterprise applications are often designed 
with an object-oriented framework (Mohamed & Douglas, 1997), and the concept goes 
back at least twenty years and has proven its advantages like reuse of code, well-
structured programs and clear transition from design analysis to production 
implementation for software development (Guimaraes, 1995).  A heap is mandatory for 
this structure, hierarchically at the top of allocated virtual memory space, and acts as an 
index of all objects which architects the program. Historically, computer software 
architectures took advantage of hierarchical design, which benefits effectively 
organizing and efficiently processing data. However, it does create a single point of 
attack surface at the top, which then potentially leads to catastrophic failure of the 





tampered with, it is an important task included to ensure confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of such program.  
Virtualization, “Containerization” and Cloud Enabling. Advanced computing 
with virtualization technology started in the era of mainframe machines, and has since 
been intensely researched and continuously developed by technology giants such as 
VMware, Oracle, Citrix and Microsoft (“Brief History of Virtualization”, 2012). The 
success of today’s cloud computing environments proves the benefits from effective 
virtualization technologies (Ferreira & Pedretti, Bridges & Brightwell & Fiala & Mueller, 
2012). Moreover, virtualization platforms enable the possibility to install and run various 
types of operating systems (virtual machines) independently on top of one physical 
computer with a hypervisor like VMware vSphere or Microsoft Hyper-V, thus computing 
resources such as memory can be shared among them (“IBM Cloud Education”, 2019). 
While this methodology has its strengths, virtual machines also operate with a heavier 
overhead, especially if only a single dedicated service is intended to reside on the 
virtual machine which is an unnecessary drawback.  
Containerization, an old bottled new wine, has its roots from the early days of 
Linux, which provides the ability to isolate running processes with shared Linux native 
kernel features (Osnat, 2018). Two main kernel features that are combined to a 
container are namespaces and cgroups. At the operating system level, namespaces 
control and separates system resources to process or process groups, basically 
isolating processes down to their own space (Evans, 2016). There are various available 





assigns pid from 1 for the processes running inside; networking namespace, works with 
iptables and allows processes to have independent IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, ports or 
firewall rules from their host operating system. And under the same idea, user 
namespace creates users and groups with dedicated UID and GID, and mount 
namespace permits processes to mount or unmount its own filesystem. Creating names 
can be as easy as executing the command “unshare” with intended option flags. Figure 
5 demonstrates the creation of a new PID namespace.  
ldai@thesis:~$ ps -aux | grep bash 
ldai       1689  0.0  0.0  21492  5096 pts/0    Ss   21:01   
0:00 -bash 
ldai       1701  0.0  0.0  21496  5068 pts/0    S    21:01   
0:00 -bash 
ldai       1808  0.0  0.0  13136  1036 pts/0    S+   21:28   
0:00 grep --color=auto bash 
ldai@thesis:~$ sudo unshare -f -p --mount-proc bash 
[sudo] password for ldai: 
root@thesis:~# ps -aux 
USER        PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   
TIME COMMAND 
root          1  0.0  0.0  21276  4916 pts/0    S    21:22   
0:00 bash 
root          9  0.0  0.0  38376  3476 pts/0    R+   21:23   
0:00 ps -aux 
root@thesis:~# exit 
exit 
Figure 5. Creating of a PID namespace 
In this case, new process “bash” inside the newly created PID namespace immediately 
started with PID 1 instead of 1689 from the host, and the user became root. With 
another terminal shell, the “nsenter” command can be used to access existing 
namespaces. Cgroups, an abbreviation of control groups, sets limitations to resources 





created with a command from the “cgroup-tools” package, called “cgcreate”. Figure 6 
shows a sample memory control group setup. 
Install cgcreate with: sudo apt install cgroup-tools 
Create cgroups with 64mb memory limit: 
ldai@thesis:~$ sudo cgcreate -a ldai -g memory:64mb 










Executing Java code which take 65Mbytes to run. 
ldai@thesis:~$ sudo cgexec -g memory:64mb java memoryeater 
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java 
heap space 
        at memoryeater.main(memoryeater.java:10) 
 
Figure 6. Memory control group configuration 
In 2013, Docker as a container platform provider, helped popularized the concept of 
containerization, and according to Docker over 3.5 million applications have been 
“containerized” with their Docker engine (“Docker eWeek”, n.d.). Figure 7 below 
describes a basic idea of how a Docker container differs from a regular virtualization 
platform. Docker as an open source container solution provider, offers unique answers 
to application level virtualizations, which makes applications run without dependencies 
to host operating systems and hardware configurations. In the article “Linux Kernel 
Vulnerabilities: State-of-the-art Defenses and Open Problems”, that Chen, Mao, Wang, 





overflow” and “Memory mismanagement” are typical kernel vulnerabilities, unauthorized 
or intended heap modifications will lead to failure of associated code runtime. 
Architectural security is rather challenging today, with the larger amount of resource 
sharing and scaling playing an important role in cloud computing environments 
(Manikandasaran & Raja, 2018).  
App1 App2 App3  App1 App2 App3 







 Docker Engine 
Hypervisor  Shared Host OS Kernel 
Host Operating System  
Hardware  Hardware 
   
 
Figure 7. Virtualization & Containerization 
Literature Related to the Methodology  
Research Foundation. A previous research study by Dai, Guster and Rice 
(2019), stated that the key for tracking where objects reside is to reference their 
memory locations, which then leads to the heap. However, acquiring heap memory 
addresses of a running process in Linux only requires essential tools that comes with 
most Linux distributions. The research also identified that the heap of a non-root-user 
initiated process resides in user memory space and has permissions which allows a 
user level to read and write but is isolated from other processes with a “private” flag. 
Though a root level process would certainly be able to overwrite it. The article also 
stated that, after Java code is being packaged inside a Docker container, the memory 





Though it added another layer of abstraction to protect the heap, the authors were able 
to clobber the heap process of the docker daemon to demonstrate a denial of service 
attack with little evidence left in log files. It will be interesting to discover how much 
damage, a Docker container which has mounted to host /proc directory, can do to host 
level user processes, root processes (docker daemon) or even filesystem.  
Tools in Windows. In the operating system world of Microsoft Windows, there 
are also a number of native, as well as third-party debugging tools that are capable of 
searching through process data; such as for list related open files – Windows Process 
Explorer or to view memory or edit with custom values by – WinDbg (Microsoft 
Documentation, 2017). However, the way Docker containers operate in Windows is 
much different than how they do in Linux. For example, the Windows version of Docker 
engine, exposes system APIs through DLL files instead of Linux syscalls, and 
containers need at least some Windows kernel level DLLs to support operating system 
level API calls. And that means, the separation of application containers cannot be 
completely done away from system services and other DLL files, and it does not matter 
what language the containerized program is written in (Walker, 2018).  
Summary 
From system architecture to kernel memory management functionalities and 
policies, heap protection seems to be well thought out. Development and 
implementation of Docker containers is still strongly undergoing change, and current 
research literature relies more on basic functionalities of the operating systems 





Linux, tests are ready to be done in a similar way to illustrate the possibilities of a denial 
of service attack initiated from a clobbered heap and compare both operating systems. 
Moreover, with these research conclusions and documentation of system level tooling, 






Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction  
 To provide accurate and understandable results of this comparison study, it is 
necessary to build, and test Docker container environments based on different host 
operating systems. The goal is to determine based on which host operating system a 
given Docker container engine is running, which containerized program has minimum to 
no impact from possible attack on the host. Various attacks will be simulated like a side 
channel attack, buffer overflow attack and direct content modifications all done on the 
memory level.  
Design of the Study 
 In the literature review section, the research methodology introduced becomes a 
foundation of the design to this test bed. To accomplish the study goal, four testing 
scenarios are created, in consideration of multiple techniques to distribute possible 
negative impact to running code from a sidecar Docker container. One or more 
containers are pulled or configured for each stage. In Test 1, the container is built with 
Ubuntu Linux 18.04 base image and the “nano” program added on top, which offers 
access to a shell and text editor for potential required changes. Test 2 requires two 
containers, one built with an official OpenJDK base image, and wraps java code 
“stayrunning”, which is intended to keep providing a timestamp on stdout (screen) until 
interruption. The second container is built from Ubuntu Linux with debugging tools 
installed, in this case, it’s built with GUN Debugger. The container “stayrunning” and 





OpenJDK packaging a java code that runs and keeps consuming memory and aims to 
verify OOM practice of the system kernel. Lastly, a container with docker-cli interface 
will be created to have the basic ability to interact with a mounted host docker daemon 
socket. Within the host operating system, users ldai (uid 1000) and user (uid1001) are 
created, both users are added to group docker (gid 999) which has permission to 
execute commands to interact with docker daemon, however, only user ldai has sudo 
permission to run root level commands. Docker container instruction scripts and source 
code of java programs can be seen in Appendices A and B. In these test scenarios, the 
host operating system will be the changing variable, one being Ubuntu Linux, the other 
being Microsoft Windows 10, and the Docker engine version, Docker container 
packaged simple programs, and all other dependencies will remain the same.  
Test-bed Scenarios and Purposes  
Test 1: User ldai (uid 1000) has a plain text file stored in its home directory, with 
permission to read and write only by owner. User (uid 1001) tries to initiate unauthorized 
file system access of ldai’s home directory by bind mounting “/home/ldai” into container 
“test1”. This test checks the possibility of one getting elevated access with root 
permission via Docker container, which not only implies kernel namespace security 
effectiveness but also becomes an essential requirement proceeding to following tests.  
Test 2: With container “stayrunning” activated by ldai (uid 1000), user (uid 1001) 
is normally not permitted to access memory mappings and heap segments of such code 
without being the owner of it or having root permissions. This test utilizes “test2” 





privileges from the host system. This test checks if the system kernel prevents a user 
with elevated root access beyond PID namespace and overwrite memory segments of 
other processes.  
 Test 3: With container packaged java code “stayrunning” initiated in the 
background, user (uid 1001) executes containerized “memoryeater” code, which 
exhausts memory space by continuously consuming it, and tests will be conducted with 
smaller chunks and relatively larger pages for a comparison of kernel reaction. 
Container “test2” will also be used to gain access to “/proc” directory of “stayrunning” 
container process, tests are to be continued by overwrites to “oom_score_adj” with a 
larger number, and manually trick kernel to initiate OOM kill by passing “f” flag to file 
“/proc/sysrq_trigger”. This test verifies effectiveness of OOM kernel memory policy 
implementation and potential security threats. 
Test 4: Again, with “stayrunning” container functioning, user (uid 1001) tries with 
container “test4” which has host docker daemon socket mounted and interacts with host 
docker daemon to stop other running containers. Proposal of container with mounted 
docker daemon socket might seem to be an unusual way to use container technology 
overall, but it is a proper method to test if host docker daemon can be controlled with a 
sidecar container, and how would kernel namespace prevent these activities? How are 
log files going to keep track of them? 
The above tests are to be conducted on both operating system variations, 
targeting for a thorough comparison of reactions from kernel policies implementations 






 Data collection is crucial to this study, there is one data collection table designed 
for each test described above. Tables are aimed to accurately record test results and 
represent them in an easy-to-read fashion. The step-by-step test processes are to be 
recorded by shell command tables or screenshots, whichever applies better.  
Hardware and Software Environment 
Dell XPS 9360 – Specification: 
CPU: Intel i7 8550U (1.80Ghz) 
RAM: 16.0 GB (15.7 usable) 
SSD: 512 GB M.2 NVMe  
OS: Windows 10 (Version 1903) 
 Virtual Machine: 
i. Ubuntu server: 18.04 






Tools and Techniques  
Ubuntu Linux. GDB: GNU Debugger, debugging tools which allows examination 
and modification to memory content of given running program in Linux. 
Windows. Process Explorer: Displays basic information of a running process, 
such as PID and associated open DLL files.  
RAMMap: Displays memory usage, priority information and physical range of 
given process ID. 
WinDbg: Debugging tool for use in Windows, similar to GDB in Linux. 
Summary 
 The test stages of this study are designed to step one on top of each other. The 
lower lever tests are essential for the next process. These tests should go through 
smoothly in a Linux environment. However, they are not guaranteed to work in all 
Windows environments, because some of the testing tools developed for Windows are 
developed with a Graphical User Interface, where Docker container for Windows runs in 





Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 In the “Data Presentation” section, a step-by-step testing process will be listed as 
in either shell command line records in tables, or screenshots of user interfaces. The 
following tables will summarize results of each test in a “Data Analysis” section. 
Data Presentation 
Ubuntu Linux Test-bed Configuration 
ldai@thesis:~$ uname -a 
Linux thesis 4.15.0-91-generic #92-Ubuntu SMP Fri Feb 28 
11:09:48 UTC 2020 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux 




ldai@thesis:~$ id user 
uid=1001(user)gid=1001(user)groups=1001(user),999(docker) 
user@thesis:~/test2$ sudo cat 
user is not in the sudoers file.  This incident will be 
reported. 
User Details 
ldai@thesis:~$ ls -la aaa 
-rw------- 1 ldai ldai 29 Mar 26 20:34 aaa 
ldai@thesis:~$ cat aaa 
There is only one line here. 
Plain Text File owned by ldai with 600 permission 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker -v 
Docker version 19.03.5, build 633a0ea838 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker-compose -v 
docker-compose version 1.25.3, build d4d1b42b 
Docker Engine Version 






Windows Version Details Content of “aaa.txt” 
  
User lidai has full permission User is no permission 
PS C:\Users\lidai\thesis\os> docker -v 





Docker Engine Version 
Test 1 – Ubuntu Linux 
ldai@thesis:/$ su user 
Password: 
user@thesis:/$ ls -la /home 
total 16 
drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Feb  3 21:40 . 
drwxr-xr-x 25 root root 4096 Mar 25 20:29 .. 
drwxr-xr-x  6 ldai ldai 4096 Mar 26 20:34 ldai 
drwxr-xr-x  5 user user 4096 Feb  9 16:33 user 
user@thesis:/$ ls -la /home/ldai/aaa 
-rw------- 1 ldai ldai 29 Mar 26 20:34 /home/ldai/aaa 
user@thesis:/$ cat /home/ldai/aaa 
cat: /home/ldai/aaa: Permission denied 
Verify if other user (1001) can access ldai (1000)’s file 
user@thesis:~$ docker ps 
CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND             
CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               
NAMES 
user@thesis:~$ docker images 
REPOSITORY          TAG                 IMAGE ID            
CREATED             SIZE 
user@thesis:~$ docker build -t test1:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  18.94kB 
Step 1/2 : FROM ubuntu:18.04 
18.04: Pulling from library/ubuntu 
5bed26d33875: Pull complete 
f11b29a9c730: Pull complete 
930bda195c84: Pull complete 




Status: Downloaded newer image for ubuntu:18.04 
 ---> 4e5021d210f6 
Step 2/2 : RUN apt update && apt -y install nano 
 ---> Running in 4892ac1b7b56 
Removing intermediate container 4892ac1b7b56 
 ---> f63075002cd4 





Successfully tagged test1:latest 
user@thesis:~$ docker images 
REPOSITORY          TAG                 IMAGE ID            
CREATED             SIZE 
test1               latest              f63075002cd4        
56 seconds ago      93.5MB 
ubuntu              18.04               4e5021d210f6        6 
days ago          64.2MB 
user@thesis:~$ docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=/home/ldai,target=/test/ldai test1 
root@1cd82de03972:/# cd /test/ldai 
root@1cd82de03972:/test/ldai# ls -la aaa 
-rw------- 1 1000 1000 29 Mar 27 01:34 aaa 
root@1cd82de03972:/test/ldai# cat aaa 
There is only one line here. 
root@1cd82de03972:/test/ldai# echo 'NOW! There are TWO 
lines!' >> aaa 
root@1cd82de03972:/test/ldai# cat aaa 
There is only one line here. 




User (1001) successfully elevated permission then accessed and modified ldai 




ldai@thesis:~$ cat aaa 
There is only one line here. 
NOW! There are TWO lines! 
ldai@thesis:~$ stat aaa 
  File: aaa 
  Size: 55              Blocks: 8          IO Block: 4096   
regular file 
Device: 802h/2050d      Inode: 1572867     Links: 1 
Access: (0600/-rw-------)  Uid: ( 1000/    ldai)   Gid: ( 
1000/    ldai) 
Access: 2020-03-26 21:28:42.859029240 -0500 
Modify: 2020-03-26 21:28:39.947011864 -0500 





 Birth: - 
File aaa still has same metadata associated.  
Test 1 – Microsoft Windows 10 
 
Verify user cannot access file aaa.txt 
PS C:\thesis\test1> docker build -t test1:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  2.048kB 
Step 1/2 : FROM ubuntu:18.04 
18.04: Pulling from library/ubuntu 
5bed26d33875: Pull complete                                                                                             
f11b29a9c730: Pull complete                                                                                             
930bda195c84: Pull complete                                                                                             




Status: Downloaded newer image for ubuntu:18.04 
 ---> 4e5021d210f6 
Step 2/2 : RUN apt-get update && apt-get -y install nano 
 ---> Running in e559d10ea86d 
Removing intermediate container e559d10ea86d 
 ---> dc6be42f2de9 
Successfully built dc6be42f2de9 
Successfully tagged test1:latest 
SECURITY WARNING: You are building a Docker image from 
Windows against a non-Windows Docker host. All files and 
directories added to build context will have '-rwxr-xr-x' 
permissions. It is recommended to double check and reset 
permissions for sensitive files and directories. 





PS C:\thesis\test1> docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=c:/thesis,target=/test test1 
root@db3d0b5ce994:/# cd test 
root@db3d0b5ce994:/test# ls 
Dockerfile  os  stayrunning.class  test1  test2  test3  test4 
root@db3d0b5ce994:/test# cd os 
root@db3d0b5ce994:/test/os# ls 
root@db3d0b5ce994:/test/os# ls -la 
total 0 
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root    0 Mar 28 01:26 . 
drwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4096 Mar 28 01:26 .. 
 
 
“test1” container started after allowing mount by clicking “Share it” 
 
Root user inside container was not able to see “aaa.txt” but was able to see other files 
with access permission. 
PS C:\thesis\test1> docker run mcr.microsoft.com/windows:1903 
Unable to find image 'mcr.microsoft.com/windows:1903' locally 





af1a530dff54: Downloading [====================>                              
]  1.517GB/3.657GB                                                 
c0f80931c4bb: Downloading 





Status: Downloaded newer image for 
mcr.microsoft.com/windows:1903 
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18362.720] 




Getting “windows” container, because license issues, this study cannot run 
microsoft/nanoserver or Microsoft/servercore images. 




Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 
 
Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6 
 
PS C:\> echo "there is now two lines" >> c:\test\os\aaa.txt 
PS C:\> 






File edited successfully. 
Test 2 – Ubuntu Linux 
ldai@thesis:~$ java stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:48:35 CDT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:48:55 CDT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:49:15 CDT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:49:35 CDT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:49:55 CDT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Thu Mar 26 
21:50:15 CDT 2020 
Running Java code “stayrunning” on raw host by ldai (1000) 
user@thesis:~/test2$ ps -aux | grep jaca 
user      12051  0.0  0.0  13136  1108 pts/1    S+   21:57   
0:00 grep --color=auto jaca 
user@thesis:~/test2$ ps -aux | grep java 
ldai      12002  0.3  0.5 4748916 41820 pts/0   Sl+  21:55   
0:00 java stayrunning 
user      12053  0.0  0.0  13136  1032 pts/1    S+   21:57   
0:00 grep --color=auto java 
user@thesis:~/test2$ cd /proc/12002 
user@thesis:/proc/12002$ cat maps | grep heap 
cat: maps: Permission denied 
User (1001) does not have permission to view memory mapping of such running java 
code. 
user@thesis:~/test2$ docker build -t test2:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  2.048kB 
Step 1/2 : FROM ubuntu:18.04 
 ---> 4e5021d210f6 
Step 2/2 : RUN apt update && apt -y install libc6-dbg gdb 
valgrind 
 ---> Running in 98729dfbc0d2 
Removing intermediate container 98729dfbc0d2 





Successfully built 1d2dbc59adc4 
Successfully tagged test2:latest 
Building test2 container image with debugging tools installed. 
user@thesis:~/test2$ docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=/proc,target=/test/proc  test2 
root@9bbd6b210161:/# cd /test/proc/12002 
root@9bbd6b210161:/test/proc/12002# cat maps 
cat: maps: Permission denied 
root@9bbd6b210161:/test/proc/12002# cat pagemap 
cat: pagemap: Permission denied 
root@9bbd6b210161:/test/proc/12002# cat stack 
cat: stack: Permission denied 
root@9bbd6b210161:/test/proc/12002# exit 
exit 
Still not able to access virtual memory mappings, with elevated root permission. 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker build -t stayrunning:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon    105kB 
Step 1/3 : FROM openjdk:latest 
latest: Pulling from library/openjdk 
cd17e56c322c: Pull complete 
ecdd73bb9922: Pull complete 




Status: Downloaded newer image for openjdk:latest 
 ---> e2b050e4e3da 
Step 2/3 : COPY ./stayrunning.class . 
 ---> 5d0c5d201dea 
Step 3/3 : CMD java stayrunning 
 ---> Running in 6649376d29c7 
Removing intermediate container 6649376d29c7 
 ---> d8b148a44480 
Successfully built d8b148a44480 
Successfully tagged stayrunning:latest 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker run -it stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
03:26:40 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 





This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
03:27:20 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
03:27:40 GMT 2020 
Build docker container image and run java code “stayrunning” 
user@thesis:~/test2$ ps -aux | grep java 
root      19665  0.1  0.4 4783940 39024 pts/0   Ssl+ 22:44   
0:04 java stayrunning 
root      20721  0.2  0.4 4783940 38200 pts/0   Ssl+ 23:19   
0:01 java stayrunning 
user      21681  0.0  0.0  13136  1004 pts/1    S+   23:28   
0:00 grep --color=auto java 
user@thesis:~/test2$ docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=/proc,target=/test/proc --pid=host --
privileged  test2 
root@b0d26312a293:/# cd /test/proc/20721 
root@b0d26312a293:/test/proc/20721# cat maps | grep heap 
023a8000-023c9000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  
[heap] 
root@b0d26312a293:/test/proc/20721# gdb --pid 20721 
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 8.1-0ubuntu3.2) 8.1.0.20180409-git 
Copyright (C) 2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later 
<http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> 
This is free software: you are free to change and 
redistribute it. 
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.  Type 
"show copying" 
and "show warranty" for details. 
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu". 
Type "show configuration" for configuration details. 
For bug reporting instructions, please see: 
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>. 
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online 
at: 
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>. 
For help, type "help". 
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word". 
Attaching to process 20721 
[New LWP 20767] 
[New LWP 20776] 





[New LWP 20778] 
[New LWP 20779] 
[New LWP 20780] 
[New LWP 20781] 
[New LWP 20782] 
[New LWP 20783] 
[New LWP 20784] 
[New LWP 20785] 
[New LWP 20786] 
[New LWP 20787] 
[New LWP 20788] 
[New LWP 20795] 
[New LWP 20796] 
[New LWP 20797] 
 
warning: Expected absolute pathname for libpthread in the 
inferior, but got target:/lib64/libpthread.so.0. 
 
warning: Unable to find libthread_db matching inferior's 
thread library, thread debugging will not be available. 
 
warning: Target and debugger are in different PID namespaces; 
thread lists and other data are likely unreliable.  Connec 
 
warning: Expected absolute pathname for libpthread in the 
inferior, but got target:/lib64/libpthread.so.0. 
 
warning: Unable to find libthread_db matching inferior's 
thread library, thread debugging will not be available. 
0x00007f8996170017 in pthread_join () from 
target:/lib64/libpthread.so.0 
(gdb) dump memory ~/gdbheap 0x023a8000 0x023a8f00 
(gdb) set {char [3840]} 0x023a8000 = "The heap is now 
clobbered!!!!" 
(gdb) dump memory ~/gdbheap_2 0x023a8000 0x023a8f00 
(gdb) detach 




gdbheap  gdbheap_2 
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▒▒▒root@b0d26312a293:~# xxd gdbheap 
bash: xxd: command not found 
root@b0d26312a293:~# ls 
gdbheap  gdbheap_2 
root@b0d26312a293:~# cat gdbheap_2 
The heap is now clobbered!!!!root@b0d26312a293:~# 
User 1000 was able to attach host PID namespace and by using -–privileged flag, to 
access and overwrite given heap address. 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:37:46 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:38:06 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:38:26 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:38:46 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:39:06 GMT 2020 
# 







#  SIGSEGV (0xb) at pc=0x00007f89956e8cdf, pid=1, tid=23 
# 
# JRE version: OpenJDK Runtime Environment (14.0+36) (build 
14+36-1461) 
# Java VM: OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM (14+36-1461, mixed mode, 
sharing, tiered, compressed oops, g1 gc, linux-amd64) 
# Problematic frame: 
# C 
[error occurred during error reporting (printing problematic 
frame), id 0xb, SIGSEGV (0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995cd21c5] 
 
# Core dump will be written. Default location: Core dumps may 
be processed with "/usr/share/apport/apport %p %s %c %d %P 
%E" (or dumping to //core.1) 
# 
# An error report file with more information is saved as: 
# //hs_err_pid1.log 
# 
# If you would like to submit a bug report, please visit: 
#   https://bugreport.java.com/bugreport/crash.jsp 
# 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[error occurred during error reporting (), id 0xb, SIGSEGV 
(0xb) at pc=0x00007f8995bccbb7] 
[Too many errors, abort] 
[Too many errors, abort] 
[Too many errors, abort] 
[Too many errors, abort] 





[Too many errors, abort] 
[Too many errors, abort] 
[Too many errors, abort] 
 [Too many errors, abort] 
Container packaged java code is no longer running. 
Test 2: Microsoft Windows 10 
PS C:\thesis> docker build -t stayrunning:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  10.24kB 
Step 1/3 : FROM openjdk:latest 
 ---> 6adc576f6a58 
Step 2/3 : COPY ./stayrunning.class . 
 ---> Using cache 
 ---> c3727279bb9f 
Step 3/3 : CMD java stayrunning 
 ---> Using cache 
 ---> 6e23da6cbf17 
Successfully built 6e23da6cbf17 
Successfully tagged stayrunning:latest 
SECURITY WARNING: You are building a Docker image from 
Windows against a non-Windows Docker host. All files and 
directories added to build context will have '-rwxr-xr-x' 
permissions. It is recommended to double check and reset 
permissions for sensitive files and directories. 
PS C:\thesis> docker run -it stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
15:51:05 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
15:51:07 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
15:51:09 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
15:51:11 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
15:51:13 GMT 2020 
Built and started “stayrunning” container by lidai 
PS C:\Users\user> docker ps 
CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND                  






bed1fa8adbcd        stayrunning         "/bin/sh -c 'java 
st…"   About a minute ago   Up About a minute                       
zealous_curie 
PS C:\Users\user> Get-Process -Name vmwp 
Handles  NPM(K)    PM(K)      WS(K)     CPU(s)     Id  SI 
ProcessName 
-------  ------    -----      -----     ------     --  -- ---
-------- 
    370      18     6584      20412              8712   0 
vmwp 
 
PS C:\Users\user> Stop-Process -ID 8712 
Stop-Process : Cannot stop process "vmwp (8712)" because of 
the following error: Access is denied 
At line:1 char:1 
+ Stop-Process -ID 8712 
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
    + CategoryInfo          : CloseError: 
(System.Diagnostics.Process (vmwp):Process) [Stop-Process], 
ProcessCommandEx 
   ception 
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : 
CouldNotStopProcess,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.StopProcess
Command 
User can list running docker containers process ID of “Virtual Machine Worker 
Process” but cannot stop such container due to lack of permission. 
PS C:\Program Files\Docker\Docker> .\DockerCli.exe -
SwitchDaemon 
 error during connect: Get 
http://%2F%2F.%2Fpipe%2Fdocker_engine/v1.40/containers/json: 
open //./pipe/docker_engine: The system cannot find the file 
specified. In the default daemon configuration on Windows, 
the docker client must be run elevated to connect. This error 
may also indicate that the docker daemon is not running. 
PS C:\Program Files\Docker\Docker> docker ps 
error during connect: Get 
http://%2F%2F.%2Fpipe%2Fdocker_engine/v1.40/containers/json: 
open //./pipe/docker_engine: The system cannot find the file 
specified. In the default daemon configuration on Windows, 
the docker client must be run elevated to connect. This error 





PS C:\Program Files\Docker\Docker> PS C:\Users\user> docker 
ps 
Get-Process : A positional parameter cannot be found that 
accepts argument 'docker'. 
At line:1 char:1 
+ PS C:\Users\user> docker ps 
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
    + CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (:) [Get-
Process], ParameterBindingException 
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : 
PositionalParameterNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Get
ProcessCommand 
User tris to switch from Docker Linux container mode to Windows container mode via 
PowerShell command line interface but interrupted (crashed) docker daemon. 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
16:35:04 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
16:35:06 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
16:35:08 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
16:35:10 GMT 2020 
time="2020-03-28T11:35:12-05:00" level=error msg="error 
waiting for container: unexpected EOF" 
PS C:\thesis> docker run -it  stayrunning 
C:\Program Files\Docker\Docker\resources\bin\docker.exe: 
error during connect: Post 
http://%2F%2F.%2Fpipe%2Fdocker_engine/v1.40/containers/create
: open //./pipe/docker_engine: The system cannot find the 
file specified. In the default daemon configuration on 
Windows, the docker client must be run elevated to connect. 
This error may also indicate that the docker daemon is not 
running. 
See 'C:\Program Files\Docker\Docker\resources\bin\docker.exe 
run --help'. 







However, docker desktop application is still running 
PS C:\thesis> docker run -it  stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:06:53 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:06:55 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:06:57 GMT 2020 
Restarted docker daemon and “stayrunning” container 
PS C:\Users\user> docker ps 
CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND                  
CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               
NAMES 
d624e2b49317        stayrunning         "/bin/sh -c 'java 
st…"   3 minutes ago       Up 3 minutes                            
unruffled_blackburn 
PS C:\Users\user> docker exec -it d624 /bin/sh 
sh-4.2# ps 
sh: ps: command not found 
sh-4.2# cd /proc/22 
sh-4.2# cat maps | grep heap 
01d46000-01d88000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  
[heap] 
User is still able to find heap memory allocation information. But would not have 
enough tools around unless a Windows container switch can be done while the Linux 
container is running. 
Test 3: Ubuntu Linux 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker run -it stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 





This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:53:36 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
04:53:56 GMT 2020 
Start “stayrunning” container 
user@thesis:~/test3$ docker build -t memoryeater:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  4.096kB 
Step 1/3 : FROM openjdk:latest 
 ---> e2b050e4e3da 
Step 2/3 : COPY ./memoryeater.class . 
 ---> 8d27609c1c06 
Step 3/3 : CMD java memoryeater 
 ---> Running in ab989c51b079 
Removing intermediate container ab989c51b079 
 ---> 255067894aaf 
Successfully built 255067894aaf 
Successfully tagged memoryeater:latest 
Build “memoryeater” container 
user@thesis:~/test3$ docker run -it memoryeater 
free memory: 67834240 
free memory: 91081408 
free memory: 90557120 
free memory: 90557120 
free memory: 221104896 
free memory: 155568896 
free memory: 90557184 
free memory: 351141072 
free memory: 285605072 
free memory: 220593360 
free memory: 480634248 
free memory: 415622536 
free memory: 350610824 
free memory: 611175872 
free memory: 545639872 
free memory: 480628160 
free memory: 741196656 
free memory: 675660656 
free memory: 610648944 
free memory: 785241144 
free memory: 719705144 





free memory: 590207696 
free memory: 524671696 
free memory: 459659984 
free memory: 395167280 
free memory: 329631280 
free memory: 264619568 
free memory: 200127696 
free memory: 134591696 
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java 
heap space 
        at memoryeater.main(memoryeater.java:10) 
Above container is designed to take up 650 megabytes until memory exhausts.  
user@thesis:~/test3$ docker build -t memoryeater:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  4.096kB 
Step 1/3 : FROM openjdk:latest 
 ---> e2b050e4e3da 
Step 2/3 : COPY ./memoryeater.class . 
 ---> b23a94ff4fc1 
Step 3/3 : CMD java memoryeater 
 ---> Running in f105de607315 
Removing intermediate container f105de607315 
 ---> 84a7b0d75fa9 
Successfully built 84a7b0d75fa9 
Successfully tagged memoryeater:latest 
user@thesis:~/test3$ docker run -it memoryeater 
free memory: 721088880 
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java 
heap space 
        at memoryeater.main(memoryeater.java:10) 
Above container is modified to take up 1 gigabyte until memory exhausts.  
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:07:36 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:07:56 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:08:16 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:08:36 GMT 2020 





user@thesis:~$ docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=/proc,target=/test/proc --pid=host test2 
root@b61bcf4e752d:/# ps -aux | grep java 
root      19665  0.1  0.4 4783940 39356 pts/0   Ssl+ 03:44   
0:08 java stayrunning 
root      21920  0.1  0.4 4783940 38656 pts/0   Ssl+ 04:53   
0:01 java stayrunning 
root      22714  0.0  0.0  11464  1008 pts/0    S+   05:08   
0:00 grep --color=auto java 
root@b61bcf4e752d:/# cd /test/proc/21920 
root@b61bcf4e752d:/test/proc/21920# cd .. 
root@b61bcf4e752d:/test/proc# echo f > sysrq-trigger 
“oom_score_adj” is overwritten to high number, and “f” flag overwritten to “sysrq-
trigger” to manually trigger OOM Kill. 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:10:16 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:10:37 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:10:57 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:11:17 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:11:37 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
05:11:57 GMT 2020 
Killed 
ldai@thesis:~$ 
Java code in “stayrunning” container is killed  
Test 3: Microsoft Windows 10 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:33:13 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:33:15 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 
17:33:17 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Sat Mar 28 





Container “stayrunning” is up 
PS C:\thesis\test3> docker build -t memoryeater:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon   5.12kB 
Step 1/3 : FROM openjdk:latest 
 ---> 6adc576f6a58 
Step 2/3 : COPY ./memoryeater.class . 
 ---> 8728ff2dbf13 
Step 3/3 : CMD java memoryeater 
 ---> Running in 039283c91ada 
Removing intermediate container 039283c91ada 
 ---> d68398122600 
Successfully built d68398122600 
Successfully tagged memoryeater:latest 
SECURITY WARNING: You are building a Docker image from 
Windows against a non-Windows Docker host. All files and 
directories added to build context will have '-rwxr-xr-x' 
permissions. It is recommended to double check and reset 
permissions for sensitive files and directories. 
Built “memoryeater” container 
PS C:\thesis\test3> docker run -it memoryeater 
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java 
heap space 
        at memoryeater.main(memoryeater.java:10) 
Container “memoryeater” cannot be started due to lack of memory space for Java 
heap. 
OOM kill test cannot be accomplished due to a lack of tooling without “Windows” 
container mode. 
 
Test 4: Ubuntu Linux 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker ps 
CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND             
CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               
NAMES 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker run -it stayrunning 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 





This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
21:09:15 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
21:09:35 GMT 2020 
Container “stayrunning” started with no others running. 
 
user@thesis:~/test4$ docker build -t test4:latest . 
Sending build context to Docker daemon  2.048kB 
Step 1/5 : FROM ubuntu:18.04 
 ---> 4e5021d210f6 
Step 2/5 : RUN apt-get update     && apt-get -y install nano     
apt-transport-https     ca-certificates     curl     gnupg-
agent     software-properties-common 
 ---> Running in 3633cbc67518 
Removing intermediate container 3633cbc67518 
 ---> 1fd07e1a075d 
Step 3/5 : RUN curl -fsSL 
https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | apt-key add - 
 ---> Running in 44f16f014df4 
Warning: apt-key output should not be parsed (stdout is not a 
terminal) 
OK 
Removing intermediate container 44f16f014df4 
 ---> 55ec00a945aa 
Step 4/5 : RUN add-apt-repository "deb [arch=amd64] 
https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu $(lsb_release -cs) 
stable" 
 ---> Running in 824b3008755b 
Removing intermediate container 824b3008755b 
 ---> 6f47cae8997b 
Step 5/5 : RUN apt-get update     && apt-get -y install 
docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io 
 ---> Running in 437c2bb47874 
Removing intermediate container 437c2bb47874 
 ---> 932153a3db81 
Successfully built 932153a3db81 
Successfully tagged test4:latest 
Building container “test4” with docker-cli installed 
user@thesis:~/test4$ docker run -it --mount 
type=bind,source=/var/run/,target=/var/run/ test4 





CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND                  
CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               
NAMES 
f1372aa74231        test4               "/bin/bash"              
4 seconds ago       Up 2 seconds                            
dazzling_sutherland 
8612a3174684        stayrunning         "/bin/sh -c 'java 
st…"   8 minutes ago       Up 8 minutes                            
xenodochial_gould 
root@f1372aa74231:/# docker kill 8612a 
8612a 
root@f1372aa74231:/# 
Stopping “stayrunning” container with no error. 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
21:18:55 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
21:19:15 GMT 2020 
This sample program should stay running ==> Fri Mar 27 
21:19:35 GMT 2020 
ldai@thesis:~$ docker ps 
CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND             
CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               
NAMES 
f1372aa74231        test4               "/bin/bash"         3 
minutes ago       Up 3 minutes                            
dazzling_sutherland 
“Stayrunning” stopped without user ldai (1000)’s acknowledgement. 
Mar 27 16:19:53 thesis dockerd[1186]: time="2020-03-
27T16:19:53.613022943-05:00" level=warning 
msg="8612a3174684532f60991620bb84aa41f8523584c0de3f0faed6919a
11e4fd5c cleanup: failed to unmount IPC: umount 
/var/lib/docker/containers/8612a3174684532f60991620bb84aa41 
Mar 27 16:28:26 thesis dockerd[1186]: time="2020-03-
27T16:28:26.831996811-05:00" level=info msg="ignoring event" 
module=libcontainerd namespace=moby topic=/tasks/delete 
type="*events.TaskDelete" 
One record found in docker daemon log about stopped container, nothing indicating 
which user has done so. 





Test cannot be conducted due to lack of stability issue of Windows version docker 
daemon and “Windows” container mode. 
Data Analysis 
Table 3  
Test 1 Data Summary 
 Mounting Filesystem Root Access File Readable File Writeable 
Linux Y Y Y Y 
Windows Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 4 











Linux Y Y Y Y Y 
Windows Y Y N/A N/A Y 
 
Table 5 











Linux Y Y N Y Y 
Windows N Y N N/A N/A 
 
Table 6 
Test 4 Data Summary 
 Mounting Host 
Docker Daemon 






Linux Y Y Y N 
Windows N/A N/A N/A N/A 







 This chapter covers a majority of the testing process which happened in both 
operating system environments. Attempted trials and detailed steps have been 
recorded, as accurately as possible, in the data collection section and a summary of test 






Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This chapter serves as an overview of the thesis research which has been done. 
A representation of research outcomes, an explanation of how such data reflects to the 
purpose of this thesis, and any feasible future works are described in the sections of 
Results, Conclusion and Future Work. 
Results 
 From a high-level point of view, the overall methodology of this research started 
with learning from kernel documentation (i.e. manuals), with the knowledge of how 
kernel manages memory for applications. The tests were designed with a hierarchical 
mind set, each stage’s steps move forward and practices kernel functions. Results 
obtained from the study are clear and answered the following research questions.   
Q: How does kernel memory management work on Microsoft Windows or Ubuntu 
Linux?  
A: Both kernel software researched by this thesis, showed which centralized memory 
management is key to provide policy enforcement consistency, where the kernel defines 
memory allocation policies based on system reliability and security, and kernel modules 
like malloc or mbrlenare are there to offer assistance for code developing, and Out-Of-
Memory like functions are in place to enforce policy. 
Q: Can a misused Docker container become a tool for unauthorized permission 





A: According to Test 1 in this study, user accounts with group access to docker daemon 
are capable of unauthorized permission escalation to root, in both operating system 
kernels, by simply starting a new Docker container. Such that a user essentially 
becomes root within their own namespace, but this permission is carried over to a host. 
Q: Are memory mappings of running Docker containers readable or writeable by sidecar 
containers? How do reactions differ between operating systems? 
A: As Test 2 has proven, that in a Linux kernel, mapping information of code in a 
current running container, is not accessible by a non-root user other than the processes 
they own unless such user has docker group permission to start a container within the 
same daemon. The heap memory allocation is readable and writable by unauthorized 
users in this way and can bring down running code. This activity technically grants that 
user root permission to at least the same namespace, which the docker daemon is 
hosting all its containers on by default. However, this test cannot be completely done 
with Microsoft Windows, because of instability of docker daemon when switching 
operation mode and lack of essential command line debugging tools for Windows 
PowerShell.   
Q: Can kernel memory management tools be misused by non-root users within a 
Docker container for hacking? How are kernel reactions different?  
A: Kernel functions such as OOM kill is in place to prevent malicious or poorly written 





Test 3 identifies that, OOM kill helped providing reliable memory resources to running 
code while new malicious program takes an unreasonable amount of memory.  
However, OOM kill function can be manually initiated to targeted processes if a regular 
user has elevated to root access, which is made available with Docker containers. 
Unfortunately, this test also cannot be conducted with Windows equipped virtual 
machines, again because of instability of its docker daemon. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this study learned that, even though, kernel software offers 
impressive central resource management and policies, and preventative modules are in 
place to ensure reliable operation, there are always vulnerabilities or security threats if 
tools are used for an inappropriate purpose. While virtualization and containerization 
accelerate effective and efficient computing resource sharing, information security and 
protection is still a valid concern for computer users, especially enterprise users who 
provide services or hold data for the general public.  
 In other words, it is never wrong for software or DevOps engineers to wait on 
product, infrastructure development, or adopting new technologies until they fully 
understand how it fundamentally operates. Always following good security practices 
while developing is another key to lowering risk and avoiding threats.   
Future Work 
 Some of the designed tests could not be conducted during this research, 





worth studying in the future if new tools can be developed to allow researchers to 
ascertain the desired results and these findings would promote good security practices 
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Appendix A: Dockerfile Source Code 
FROM ubuntu:18.04 
RUN apt-get update \ 
    && apt-get -y install nano 
Container “Test1” 
FROM openjdk:latest 
COPY ./stayrunning.class . 
CMD java stayrunning 
Container “Stayrunning” 
FROM ubuntu:18.04 
RUN apt update \ 
    && apt -y install libc6-dbg gdb valgrind 
Container “Test2” 
FROM openjdk:latest 
COPY ./memoryeater.class . 
CMD java memoryeater 
Container “memoryeater” 
FROM ubuntu:18.04 
RUN apt-get update \ 
    && apt-get -y install nano \ 
    apt-transport-https \ 
    ca-certificates \ 
    curl \ 
    gnupg-agent \ 
    software-properties-common 
RUN curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | 
apt-key add - 
RUN add-apt-repository "deb [arch=amd64] 
https://download.docker.com/linux/ubun$ 
RUN apt-get update \ 









Appendix B: Java Program Source Code 
import java.util.Calendar; 
public class stayrunning { 
        public static void main(String args[]) { 
                stayrunning object = new stayrunning(); 
                object.waitMethod(); 
        } 
        private synchronized void waitMethod() { 
                while (true) { 
                        System.out.println("This sample 
program should stay running ==> " + 
Calendar.getInstance().getTime()); 
                        try { 
                                this.wait(20000); 
                        } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
                                e.printStackTrace(); 
                        } 
                } 





public class memoryeater 
{ 
  public static void main(String[] args) 
  { 
    Vector v = new Vector(); 
    while (true) 
    { 
      byte b[] = new byte[1073741824]; 
      v.add(b); 
      Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
      System.out.println( "free memory: " + rt.freeMemory() 
); 
    } 
  } 
} 
Memoryeater.java 
 
